China’s latest macroeconomic data paint an ugly picture. Each key metric fell short of expectations in October, with domestic consumption and investment continuing to weaken. Were it not for exports propping up industrial production, China’s economy would be in a much worse state.
Particularly worrying is the pace of decline in fixed asset investment, which encompasses agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, services, and more. In October, fixed asset investment fell 16.9% year-over-year (y-o-y)—the second sharpest decline on record after the initial months of the pandemic in 2020—and the string of negative y-o-y figures that began in mid-2025 can no longer be dismissed as a short-term phenomenon (Exhibit 1).
As of October 2026
Source: Lazard, Haver Analytics, National Bureau of Statistics
Taken together, the latest macro data suggest that what began as a housing downturn has metastasized into a broad economic crisis.
At one point, real estate represented as much as 30% of China’s GDP after including all ancillary economic activity such as hiring property brokers, financing mortgages, furnishing homes, etc.—but that share has likely been cut in half since the bursting of the housing bubble in 2020.
Since then, new home sales have slid, while housing developers have run out of cash to complete projects and have defaulted on debt. Today, prices for previously occupied homes in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai have fallen 37% from their peak, and prices in smaller cities like Tianjin are down as much as 57%, according to property agent Centaline. Year-to-date residential property sales as of October 2026 are 61% below the level of October 2021, and the floor area of new residential construction starts has declined 78%.
Given that about 90% of Chinese households own their home and that the median household has ~60% of its assets invested in residential real estate, home price declines have had an outsized impact on consumers, who have had to tighten their belts, reduce discretionary spending, and rebuild savings.
This tightening is reflected in retail sales figures, which rose only 0.4% in October from a year ago—not even keeping pace with inflation. Big ticket items have been most affected, with auto sales down 22% y-o-y, and the decline has forced China’s ~100 auto manufacturers to increasingly look abroad to offload excess production. I expect this downward trend to continue until household balance sheets stabilize.
The sharp decline in fixed asset investment signals weakening corporate confidence and a decreasing willingness to deploy capital to sustain future growth. There is little doubt that China invested too much capital in the real estate sector (and likely other areas such as infrastructure) in the past. But these recent declines are broad based and could spell trouble for China’s long-term growth outlook.
From 2020 to 2025, China powered ~30% of global GDP growth, but that contribution has since been halved. Failure to tackle structural weaknesses could mean further declines in China’s contribution to global growth and the end of the Chinese economic juggernaut itself.
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Published on 18 November 2026.
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